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FROM THE VATICAN WITH CASH : PROSECUTING MONEY
LAUNDERING IN LONDON REAL ESTATE
Jane Tien†
ABSTRACT
It is no news that donations from the Catholic faithful reemerge from the dark underground of Church finances as lace
vestments, embroidered mitres, velvet slippers, and posh mansions. A
year after Pope Francis announced the overhaul of the Vatican’s antimoney laundering (AML) laws, a makeshift courtroom in the Vatican
Museum witnessed the largest criminal trial in the Vatican’s modern
history. At the center was Cardinal Angelo Becciu—the former No. 3
in the Vatican—for allegedly defrauding the Vatican’s investment in
London real estate. After the tumbrels, now comes the reckoning: How
could the Vatican mend a broken system and effectively tackle money
laundering in real estate?
This Article initiates an overdue conversation about the
corruption crisis in St. Peter’s. Studying the world’s smallest sovereign
state yields insights applicable to the obstacles confronting the AML
community at large, such as the identification of beneficial ownership,
the costs for training AML personnel, and the proliferation of multijurisdictional compliance requirements. Positing a strategy for repair
and renewal, this Article argues that British prosecution could share
the burden for monitoring, punishing, and deterring the fiscal sins
Vatican officials commit through real properties. Such a transnational
assertion of prosecutorial power benefits the Vatican in three ways.
First, British prosecutors have access to a more expansive AML toolkit
that targets both buyer- and seller-side money laundering. By contrast,
the Vatican’s infant AML framework is ill-equipped to handle that
specialized task. Second, British prosecution, unburdened by the
constraints of operating under an absolute monarchy, could obtain
additional discovery, which in turn helps overcome the shroud of
secrecy the Vatican purposefully maintains over its courtships of
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money. Third, the Vatican’s AML apparatus suffers from chronic
understaffing, brain drain, and high turnover. A helping hand from
across the Channel provides a much-needed reprieve. This Article
concludes by calling attention to the implications on immunity and
foreign relations.
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INTRODUCTION
Secrecy, wrote Cardinal Richelieu, “is the first essential in
affairs of state.”1 The Red Eminence was commenting on seventeenthcentury French statecraft, but his insights proved clairvoyant into how
the modern Roman Catholic Church conducts its affairs. With a
penchant for internal investigations2 and the rehabilitative rather than
the punitive,3 the Vatican4 operates as a capital-chasing corporation.5
Certain “unspeakable” crimes demand the inviolable observation of
the “strictest confidentiality” among those with knowledge.6 In brief,
transparency is the eighth capital sin. Those who tell of the Vatican’s
malady risk being damned for life temporal and life eternal.
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The Vatican’s desire to keep its dealings subterranean is
especially ardent regarding its courtships of money. True to the adage,
the Lord enriches—until decades ago, when insiders revealed that the
public imagination barely scratched the tip of the iceberg.7 For a citystate with such saintly connections, it frequently flirts with earthly
offenses. As corruption scandals linked to men of the cloth made a
splash around the front pages,8 bankers and financiers serving the
Church met their untimely ends behind the bars, in ankle monitors,9
or swinging under a bridge.10 The onslaught of exposés sent the
Vatican reeling, but breaking the mold of silence was no easy task. It
was not until 2013 that the conclave elevated a reformer, who took the
name of the patron saint of the poor and vowed to end the “[t]he
worship of the golden calf of old.”11
The upshot of that worship is a money laundering epidemic
that brimmed over the Leonine Walls. Cashing in on “[a]n almost
inextricable intertwining between physical and legal persons,
investment funds, listed financial securities and non-banks and credit
institutions of various types, breadths, and [levels of] transparency,”
unprincipled lay and religious personnel engorged their private
accounts on the papacy’s real property holdings and disguised their
tracks as patronage of charitable projects but “without any
consideration of the aims and nature of the ecclesial reality.”12 When
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wedded to limited oversight and the intentional cultivation of
reticence, the superfluity of legal forms, operational structures, and
investment portfolios held by the Vatican obscures and enables the
connivance of actors intravenous and extraneous.
Ten years into Francis’ pontificate, the Vatican has initiated
three proceedings related to real estate money laundering schemes in
domestic and foreign courts. In January 2021, a Vatican court convicted
Angelo Caloia, a former president of the Vatican Bank, for embezzling
and laundering the profits from the sale of twenty-nine Church-owned
buildings in Italy.13 To date, Caloia is the highest-ranked official to be
convicted of a financial crime.14
The latest in the saga is a London property deal gone awry. In
December 2021, the Vatican accused the broker Gianluigi Torzi of
scamming it millions of dollars in the sale of a Chelsea building.15 Torzi
denied the charges. The quarrel escalated into a restraint order filed by
the Vatican against Torzi’s UK assets before the Crown Court in
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Southwark, London.16 Likewise, the proceeding skidded to an
anticlimactic end. Condemning the poor quality of its filings, the judge
handed the Vatican a crushing defeat.17
Torzi is small fry compared to what is searing in Vatican’s own
pan. In an ongoing trial nicknamed “Becciu +9,”18 the Vatican indicted
Angelo Becciu—formerly the third-most-powerful in the holy ranks—
and nine others for throwing away the London investment on
“imprudent and unreasonable speculative transactions.”19 As of
August 2022, after almost two years of teetering on the edge of
dismissal, the outcome of the case remains far from certain.20
The Vatican prosecutors aspire to a multi-front war, but their
battle strategy veers towards bad lawyering. Signs of strain pervade
the Vatican’s filings and manifest in the sluggish pace it brings suit. To
relieve the Vatican’s overextension, this Article posits a
complementary third-party model of controlling Vatican funds
laundered through London real properties.21 The London housing
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market warrants special interest for two reasons. First, London has
long been one of the favorite laundromats of corrupt foreign elites,22
justifying interest from English prosecutors to clean up suspect funds.
Second, considering that the Vatican has snatched multiple luxury
homes in the prime zip codes,23 London is a natural locale to look for
hidden wealth.
Due to three advantages of the legal system in England, this
Article argues that concurrent British prosecution can partially reverse
the exodus of Vatican capital. This Article aims not at diminishing the
Vatican’s efforts, but at advancing a burden-sharing scheme for
English prosecutors that serves the interests of both England and the
Vatican in eradicating money laundering. To formulate this proposal,
this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I breaks down the Vatican’s
AML framework into four main components: the financial organ, the
regulatory organ, the judicial organs, and the legislative organs,
supplemented with a summary of the Vatican’s AML legislations. Part
II dissects the three barriers Vatican prosecutors have encountered
when litigating at home and abroad: the lack of procedural guidance,
the influence of the pope, and the shortage of staff. Part III examines
the ways British prosecution could overcome those barriers via its
expansive procedural and substantive laws, insulated judiciary, and
large workforce. Part IV identifies the limitations of this model and
addresses concerns in establishing jurisdiction, facilitating diplomacy,
responding to the elasticity of London properties, and fostering
learning.
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OVERVIEW OF THE AML FRAMEWORK IN THE VATICAN
A. The Financial Organ: The Vatican Bank24

The purpose of the Institute is to provide for the custody and
administration of capital . . . and properties, both transferred or
entrusted to the Institute by natural or legal persons and intended for
works of religion and Christian piety.25
So sprung into existence the Vatican Bank. In 1942, Pius XII
founded the Bank to finance ecclesiastical activities during the Second
World War.26 The Bank dates back to the nineteenth-century pie
fondazioni, or pious foundations, created by Leo XIII to keep funds out
of the sight and reach of the Italian state.27 Over the years, the Bank’s
forerunners assumed many forms, but they preserved the function of
safekeeping offerings, bequests, and diocesan assets earmarked for
religious or charitable ends.28 Inheriting that essential feature, the Bank
evolved into a chimera. The public brands it as a bank, but it lacks the
hallmark attribute of a banking business, as there is no contractual
relationship between the Bank and its customers. It purports to
champion benefaction, but its history abounds with ignominy. On
paper, it protects and administers the assets, pensions, and salaries for
five categories of clients set out by its bylaws: Catholic institutions,
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clergy, employees, diplomats, and ambassadors.29 In practice, it
consorts with a far more all-embracing clientele, notably the Cosa
Nostra.30 It vows to adhere to client instructions when managing
derived income, yet it has a reputation for taking liberties with
directions and taking advantage of unwitting bankers.31 It swears
independence from the Roman Curia—the offices assisting the pope in
governing the Church32—yet it often plays a central role in the
Church’s vices when they come to the fore.
While reconstructing the Bank’s parade of scandals exceeds
the scope of this Article, the Vatican-Ambrosiano affair most directly
presages the challenges Vatican prosecutors later face in their AML
crusade. On August 25, 1982, the Milan-based Banco Ambrosiano
collapsed under over one billion dollars in bad debt.33 Like a line of
dominoes, Ambrosiano’s unraveling set in motion a high-stake parlor
game of Vatican intrigue. Prior to Ambrosiano’s collapse, Roberto
Calvi, who later became its president, erected a maze of offshore
companies to launder money for the mafia in the 1970s.34 By the end of
1981, the companies fell behind on repaying loans. Calvi secured two
letters of comfort from Archbishop Paul Marcinkus, the then head of
the Vatican Bank, ensuring debtors that the Vatican Bank was “aware[]
of [the offshore companies’] indebtedness” and “directly or indirectly
control[led]” the companies.35 Although the letters did not contain any
guarantee to honor the debts, Calvi claimed that “[b]ehind those loans
is the Vatican, the Pope.”36
Mounting arrears trapped Ambrosiano in a one-way path to
destruction. Italy’s subsequent probe revealed that Ambrosiano’s
dying days were fraught with “anomalous and reckless operations . . .
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customized beyond any banking logic,”37 where the Vatican’s specter
lurked at every turn. The Italian Minister of Treasury announced that
Italy expects “a clear assumption of responsibility by the IOR” for its
part in Ambrosiano’s underworld transactions.38 Overnight, headlines
flew, Ambrosiano’s shares tumbled, arrest warrants were issued, and
Calvi’s body dangled from the Blackfriars Bridge.39 Marcinkus
escaped judgment day under a technicality: The Italian Court of
Cassation ruled that Italy did not have jurisdiction under Article 11 of
the Lateran Pacts, which shields “central bodies of the Catholic Church
. . . from any interference on the part of the Italian State.”40 To this date,
the Vatican Bank maintains that it has “no responsibility” for
Ambrosiano’s demise and “found [itself] involved involuntarily” due
to its “special position.”41
Against the backdrop of its shadowy past, the Bank’s veil of
secrecy began to lift. Under Benedict XVI and Francis, the Bank’s
twenty-first century was laden with historical firsts. Of all the reforms,
three altered the Vatican’s AML landscape the most. First, the 2010
Monetary Agreement between the European Union and the Vatican
City State mandates the adoption of “all appropriate measures . . . with
a view to implementing the EU legal acts and rules . . . [related to the]
. . . prevention of money laundering.”42 The signing of the Agreement
was not the earliest instance that the Vatican signaled a willingness to
improve the Bank’s transparency, but it was the first time it spurred
into action.43 The most noteworthy measure is the creation of an
independent regulatory body, the Supervisory and Financial
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Information Authority (Autorità di Supervisione e Informazione
Finanziaria, “ASIF”), which supervises the Bank by providing “regular
written guidance and feedback” and conducts regular on-site
inspections to ensure implementation.44
Second, 2011 marks the first year that the Vatican, including
the Bank, submitted to an external international auditor.45 The Council
of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(“MONEYVAL”) reviews states’ “compliance with and the
effectiveness of the implementation of . . . the financial and law
enforcement measures in place to combat money laundering” against
the “global standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).”46 In
2012, noting that the Bank’s internal procedures “have come a long
way in a very short period of time,” MONEYVAL nonetheless
identified a few gaps in the Bank’s compliance framework.47 Within a
year, the Bank responded by closing more than 1,000 accounts
belonging to clients outside of the five eligible categories.48 In 2021,
MONEYVAL commended the Bank’s progress in implementing
“rigorous risk-based transaction monitoring.”49 The Vatican received
grades of “Compliant” or “Largely Compliant” on 34 out of 39
technical compliance ratings and its revamped AML system was rated
“Moderate” to “Substantial” for effectiveness.50
Third, in 2019, Francis revised the Bank’s statutes, making the
legal auditing of accounts by an external auditor mandatory for the
first time.51 Replacing internal auditors with indefinitely renewable
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posts, the external auditor now serves a three-year term renewable
only once.52 Moreover, the auditor is granted sweeping power to not
only “examine all the books and accounting documents,” but also
“request any information useful for auditing activities.”53 If
sunshine is the best antiseptic, the watchful gaze of international and
Vatican auditors heralded a new phase in the Bank’s AML campaign.
Dirty funds now faced more barriers against the combined might of
the auditors and the Vatican’s new regulatory watchdog. Yet, as
argued below, if not disciplined by powerful laws and experienced
institutions executing the laws, the Bank would inevitably revert to a
lucrative saint-making machine. 54
B. The Regulatory Organ: The Supervisory and Financial
Information Authority (“ASIF”)
The mission of the ASIF, formerly the Financial Information
Authority, is threefold: gathering and analyzing financial intelligence,
supervising the Vatican Bank, and imposing “regulation[s] pertaining
to the prevention and countering money laundering.”55 From a
fledgling institution with few staff and even fewer matters crossing its
desk when created by Benedict XVI,56 the ASIF has grown to acquire
expansive competences.57 Today, with thirteen full-time staff
members, the ASIF contains three units reflecting its tripartite
functions: the Supervisory Unit, in charge of prudential supervision
and AML-preventive supervision; the Regulation and Legal Affairs
Unit, responsible for drafting and updating regulations and guidance;
and the Financial Intelligence Unit, at the helm of operational analysis
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and strategic analysis.58 In 2020, the ASIF received eighty-nine
suspicious reports and exchanged information requests on 196 subjects
with foreign financial intelligence units.59 MONEYVAL concluded
that the ASIF’s AML activities are “not only informative and reliable
but also ha[ve] elements of comprehensiveness.”60
However, the ASIF’s growth breathes little optimism into the
Vatican’s quest for transparency; on the contrary, a decade of raids,
arrests, and leadership exoduses may forebode that the watchdog’s
bark is worse than its bite. In 2019, the Vatican gendarmes searched
the ASIF office for evidence in connection with the London property
deal, resulting in the firing of its director, the resignation of its
president and board members, and its expulsion from the Egmont
Group—a global network of financial intelligence authorities—on
grounds of data protection failures.61 One former board member
described the ASIF as “an empty shell” stripped of information
sharing and exchange capacities.62 Commentators have postulated two
opposing theories to explain the disfavor. First, the raid aimed at
torpedoing the ASIF’s investigation into 60 Sloane Avenue. The ASIF
dug too deep and unearthed evidence implicating high-ranking
officials.63 Second, the raid targeted the ASIF’s ineptitude. According
to Francis, the ASIF “did not control . . . the crimes of others [and failed]
in its duty of controls.”64 Their differences notwithstanding, these two
hypotheses unite to tell the same tale: The ASIF is powerless to halt the
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engine of corruption, whether due to an inherent failing or
bureaucratic constraints.65
C. The Judicial Organs: The Courts
In 1929, under Pius XI, the judicial system in the Vatican began
to split into two tracks, one for religious matters governed by the Holy
See and the other presiding over secular cases under the aegis of the
Vatican City State.66 The former track, adjudicating questions
pertaining to the management of the ecclesiastical side of the house,
consists of the diocesan tribunals, the ecclesiastical tribunal, the
Apostolic Tribunal of the Roman Rota, and the Supreme Tribunal of
the Signatura.67 When it comes to money laundering, the latter track is
the competent forum. Since most parties that appear before the secular
courts are Italian residents, the secular track comes to resemble the
inverted pyramid structure of its Italian counterpart.68 At the bottom
of the pyramid is the Sole Judge, presiding over a court of limited
jurisdiction. It has authority over traffic tickets, validation of
marriages, and small claims.69 Most cases involving money laundering
enter through the second tier—the Court of First Instance, which has
general jurisdiction in both civil and penal cases. The Becciu +9 suit is
currently pending before the Court of First Instance.70 Comprising the
third tier, the Court of Appeals reviews the decisions of the Court of
First Instance.71 Lastly, the Supreme Court hears appeals from the
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Court of Appeals, in addition to criminal cases concerning cardinals
and bishops that the pope chose not to hear.72
D. The Legislative Organs: The Pope and the Commission of
Cardinals
The Fundamental Law of Vatican City State promulgated by
John Paul II in 2000 sets out the two major sources of legislative power
in the Vatican: the pope and the Commission of Cardinals.73 Article 1
bestows the Supreme Pontiff “the fullness of legislative . . . powers.”74
When the pontiff chooses to relinquish that power, “a Commission
composed of a Cardinal President and other Cardinals, all named by
the Supreme Pontiff for a five-year term” may exercise it instead.75 In
other words, the Vatican legislature contains a two-tier hierarchy, with
the pope reigning supreme and the Commission acting as the gapfiller.
E. The Vatican’s AML Laws
Championing a faith that died five times,76 the Vatican
unfailingly rose from the grave with shrewder promotions of its
appeal and an ever-more-byzantine maze of law. Injunctions on
money laundering pose no exception. This Subpart proposes a division
of the Vatican’s AML laws into four generations, adopted in response
to FATF Recommendations, a series of non-binding guidance on AML
best practices, and the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive
(“AMLD”), a periodically updated framework issued by the European
Parliament for member states to implement domestically.77 The first
wave of legislations arose after the signing of the Monetary Agreement
and established four objectives for future AML laws. Upon that
groundwork, the second wave concentrates on bolstering customer
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due diligence (“CDD”) measures. Receiving that baton, the third wave
authorizes forfeiture, enhances due diligence for high-risk subjects,
and lifts the immunity of public officials. Lastly, the fourth wave,
aimed at clarifying the division of labor within the judiciary, has
emerged as the Vatican transitions into a new regulatory chapter
under Francis.
1. The First Wave.
Law No. CXXVII (“Original AML/CFT Law”), adopted on
December 30, 2010, laid the foundation of the Vatican’s AML
framework. The Original AML/CFT Law drew inspiration from FATF
Recommendations and AMLD in four areas: (1) the criminalization of
money laundering, (2) robust CDD, (3) adequate deterrence and
punishment, and (4) effective cooperation.78 For the first and fourth
pillars, the Original AML/CFT Law defines “replac[ing] or
transfer[ing] money . . . resulting from a serious offence . . . to hinder
the identification of their criminal source, or uses, in . . . activities . . .
resulting from a serious offence” as a crime for the first time.79 Article
3 includes a list of such serious offenses.80 Hence, the Original
AML/CFT Law aligns with FATF Recommendation 3, which advises
states to “criminalise money laundering on the basis of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances . . . and the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime” and apply money laundering
to “the widest range of predicate offences.”81 Since criminalization is
necessary for international cooperation, the Original AML/CFT Law
grants the Vatican admission into the club of states combating money
laundering through the “exchange of information and mutual judicial
legal assistance.”82
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For the second pillar, FATF Recommendation 10 and the third
AMLD both urge financial institutions to identify and verify the
identities of customers and beneficial owners “using reliable,
independent source documents” before the establishment of a
business relationship or the transaction.83 When an institution could
not comply with these CDD measures, it should refrain from
transacting and “consider making a report to the financial intelligence
unit (FIU).”84 To fulfill that requirement, the Original AML/CFT Law
created the ASIF, initially tasked with two main functions: performing
financial analysis and receiving communications about suspicious
activities.85 For the third pillar, the AMLR instructs that “penalties
must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”86 The Original
AML/CFT Law introduces a gradualist system authorizing “a
detention of four to twelve years and a fine of one to fifteen thousand
Euro” depending on the nature of the predicate crime.87
2. The Second Wave.
The Vatican enriched its retributive repertoire again with
Decree CLIX on January 25, 2012 (“Revised AML/CTF Law”). The
Revised AML/CTF Law concentrates on the second pillar by
enhancing CDD requirements for transactions involving politically
exposed persons and non-face-to-face customers.88 For the former,
Article 31(5) requires the ongoing monitoring of the counterparts’
status and the source of the currency they used.89 For the latter, Article
31(1) mandates the verification of the counterparts’ identity using
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“additional information, including documents [and] data . . . obtained
from a trustworthy and independent source.”90
3. The Third Wave.
Laying down the letter is only half the work. New legislation
must receive MONEYVAL’s stamp of approval.91 After the publication
of the first MONEYVAL report, 2013 ushered in a rapid expansion of
the AML infrastructure at the Vatican. Two legislations stand out from
the rest. The first is Law No. IX on Amendments to the Penal Code and
the Criminal Procedure Code, passed on July 11, 2013.92 It amended
the Vatican’s criminal code in two major ways. On the one hand, Law
No. IX empowers the courts to disrupt and dismantle money
laundering by seizing “the things that served or were destined to
commit the crime,” including “things that belong or are owned or
managed, directly or indirectly, by criminal associations . . . without
prejudice to the rights of third parties in good faith.” 93 On the other
hand, prosecutors may now charge public officials for offenses
committed “in the service of the State, abusing their powers or
violating the duties inherent in their functions” anywhere in the
world.94
On October 8, 2013, the Vatican’s extended authority to
prosecute money laundering underwent a second renewal. Law No.
XVIII on Transparency, Supervision and Financial Intelligence
replaces the Revised AML/TF Law with a precision weapon.95 The
extra ammunition it supplies cleared the way for the Caloia conviction
in 2021.96 In particular, Law No. XVIII clarifies the scope of the ASIF’s
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financial intelligence, supervisory, and regulatory function.
Furthermore, it tasked the ASIF97 with publishing and updating a list
of high-risk persons, including real estate agents transacting “as
intermediaries in the purchase, sale or letting of immovable
property.”98 In turn, these subjects must observe disclosure obligations
“when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect” money
laundering and other compliance procedures, including the
implementation of internal controls and know-your-client processes
depending on the “category and country or geographical area of the
customer.”99 When the regulated subjects fail to comply with these
regulations, the ASIF is in charge of administering warnings, civil
fines, or criminal penalties.100
4. The Fourth Wave.
In 2018, Francis introduced another generation of laws into the
Vatican’s AML arsenal. Law No. CCXLVII amends Law No. XVIII by
broadening the designated list of regulated parties to include officers
and employees “sufficiently informed about exposure to risk of money
laundering . . . [and are] in a hierarchical position that allows them . . .
to take decisions that affect exposure to risk.”101 It also imposes
additional disclosure obligations on designated individuals if they
process data or are a parent company.102
The designated persons list was not the only subject that
underwent transformation. On April 30, 2021, Francis took a foray into
judicial affairs via an Apostolic Letter in the form of a motu proprio, a
document “personally signed by the pope to signify his special interest
in the subject”;103 common crimes concerning cardinals and bishops
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are no longer the competence of the Supreme Court.104 The Court of
First Instance now has jurisdiction over offenses unrelated to the
violation of ecclesiastical laws committed by prelates and laypersons
alike.105 In his letter, Francis cited concerns of procedural equality
among “all members of the Church and their equal dignity,”
regardless of their station.106 One substantial carve-out remains: The
Vicar of Christ must sign off on cases “involving the Most Eminent
Cardinals and the Most Excellent Bishops”—the highest ranked clergy
members—before any judge could initiate the proceeding.107 On the
books, it seems a new springtime has arrived in Rome for keen
prosecutors. But in reality, the Vatican’s dirty-money problem is far
from being resolved. The prosecutors find themselves struggling to
forge a path within an incomplete legal labyrinth, besieged by
inexperience, hemmed in by bureaucracy, and wrecked by scarce
resources.108
II.

PROBLEMS WITH THE VATICAN AML FRAMEWORK

For the Church, 2021 was the year of house-cleaning and bared
altars. Before we eulogize the legislative renovations, the improved
MONEYVAL ratings, and the more precise division of labor among
the agencies, 2021 was also the year that the Vatican’s long-simmering
corruption crisis came to a boil in the three proceedings: the Caloia
conviction, the Becciu +9 suit, and the request to seize Torzi’s accounts.
In all three, the promise of the Vatican’s AML infrastructure loses
impetus when subjected to scrutiny. Hailed as an opening salvo, the
Caloia conviction almost claimed the scalp of a senior official, but
Caloia’s advanced age meant that the servants of heaven may still be
above the law. The Becciu +9 suit will likely “go on for a very long
time,” mired down by disagreements between the prosecution and
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defense over fundamental procedural doctrine.109 The Vatican’s
performance before the Southwark Crown Court turned out to be the
most revealing. Commented Judge Baumgartner on the Vatican’s
seizure request: “I do not consider the material non-disclosures and
misrepresentations that I have found to be minor. They are, in some
instances, egregious . . . ‘so appalling.’”110
A similar comment could have sprouted from the pen tips of
anyone monitoring the Vatican’s money laundering scandal. The
prosecutors’ inability to curate a cogent argument left judges aghast
and observers questioning the Vatican’s ability to declare war in
multiple theaters. As those who swore to shed light on the dark
chapters of Vatican history find themselves casting the longest
shadow, the Vatican’s setbacks at home and abroad warrant a lookwithin. This Subpart argues that three flaws in the Vatican’s AML
apparatus were responsible for eliciting Baumgartner’s dismay. First,
the Vatican’s procedural laws lack instructions on their
implementation;
second,
the
Vatican’s
AML
campaign
disproportionately rests on the direction the smoke blows over the
Sistine Chapel; third, the Vatican’s regulatory and judicial organs face
a staffing shortage.
The first bomb that cratered the Vatican’s AML landscape was
the confusion over how to deploy its newly minted laws before the
merits stage. As the Vatican’s money troubles fizz and bubble, a glut
of questions that the Church’s two millennia in existence do not
elucidate begin to surface. Above all, the prosecutors are trying to
wrench out two procedural bottlenecks that could augur their case’s
death if left unresolved. First, there is no established protocol for
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discovery. In the Becciu +9 case, the prosecution repeatedly tested the
limits of due process by refusing to share evidence, including the
deposition of a conspirator-turned-star witness, Monsignor
Perlasca.111 Yet, so central were Perlasca’s testimonies that the
prosecutors rewarded him with a golden ticket out of indictment.112
The prosecutors’ withholding provoked protests of fair trial rights
from the defense and a court order for the prosecution to redo its
investigations of four defendants.113 The standoff is far from over. In
January 2022, the defense again moved for dismissal, complaining that
“out of 255 computer files seized by prosecutors, only 16 have been
released for examination by defense lawyers,” and “none would
qualify as ‘forensic copies.’”114
In the same vein, the lawyers are locking horns over a second
procedural problem: the precarious role of Italian law. At the
threshold, there is little consensus over whether to use the Vatican
canon law, a body of ecclesiastical legal principles, or the Italian code
of criminal procedure. Before Francis introduced revisions in 2013, the
Vatican’s criminal procedure was based on the Italian Finocchiaro
Aprile Code of 1913.115 When the defense hammered away at the




:;,=,:$&!#56;, 

0*63,#05-0,3+%%%#$"&$% $%$*$%%$
 *;       /;;7:()*5,>:.6*64 5;,95(;065(3>09, ;69@
=(;0*(5;90(3+,-,5:,8<,:;065:3,.(3:@:;,4  

  <556 96*/6 :;,=,: $!% $%$ % % # $ %#
!# &#$  ,*    /;;7:*9<?56>*64=(;0*(5   +,:70;,
:,;)(*2:=(;0*(5,+0;690(3+,-,5+:;90(3796*,+<9,: $ %  %  %#&$%
(%' # #$%!# $&% #$#& <.     
/;;7:>>>7033(9*(;/630**64+,-,5:,;,(4*(556;),;9<:;,+>0;/  ;033 9,-<:05.
;6:/(9,(*67@;/,796:,*<;065,=,5;<(33@*65*,+,+;6(336>;/,+,-,5:,;6=0,>;/,
9,*69+05.>0;/05;/,79,40:,6-;/,6<9;C(4,(:<9,>/0*//(:9,*,5;3@),,5(+67;,+
)@;(30(5*6<9;:-69/(5+305.:,5:0;0=,,=0+,5*,D

 (55(/ 96*2/(<: %  %# # $&% #$  # #
&(%$& #%  !#&#* (5     
/;;7:>>>*(;/630*5,>:(.,5*@*645,>:  =(;0*(5-05(5*,;90(3
796:,*<;69:(.(05*/(9.,*(9+05(3),**0<>0;/:<)695(;0656-7,91<9@

3(<+06,5;03,  '%+ #%' %%&$$$$&
& , %# % %#&% #*$%%
$% $)& &$  *# %# % %  % %  &  
       5   C%&,336 ;(;6+,33(0;;A
+,3 "(;0*(56 :656 9,*,70;0 7,9 8<(5;6 (;;0,5, (33( 4(;,90( 7,5(3, 0 *6+0*0 0;(30(50
7,5(3,+,3 *6:B+,;;66+0*,$(5(9+,330,+0796*,+<9(7,5(3,+,3  *6:B



!!#!





prosecution’s excessive discretion, it offered decisions of the Italian
Constitutional Court as proof. In their rebuttal, the prosecutors
invoked the Church’s spiritual riches. They proclaimed that their
authority derived from the Pope, “the basis of [whose power] is
ultimately divine law.”116 Since Italian law does not have the same
heavenly prestige, it has no place in the pope’s backyard.117
Unexpectedly, during the evidence skirmish, the prosecution wavered
from its initial position and defended its refusal to share evidence
using the Finocchiaro Aprile Code, which forbids the recording and
dissemination of “those who do not expressly consent” “when
photographic or audiovisual recording of the activities is
authorized.”118
This procedural dispute conceals a larger second flaw in the
Vatican legal system. Given the prerogatives of the pope, it is dubious
that the Vatican judiciary could be truly independent. Another
squabble between the Becciu prosecution and defense illustrates this
issue. Prior to the trial, the Pontiff empowered the prosecution to
conduct precautionary measures without a judge’s scrutiny and lifted
Becciu’s immunity so he could stand trial.119 The defense admonished
that the Pope’s intervention “suspend[ed] legal certainty,” constituted
“ad hoc criminal procedure,” and transformed the Court into a
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“special tribunal” customary of authoritarian regimes.120 The
prosecutors responded that the Pope is the judge, the legislature, and
the executive.121 The troubling implications of this declaration aside,
the all-powerfulness of the pope introduces volatility in the direction
of the judiciary. Because the pope appoints all magistrates, who the
conclave summons to the throne essentially determines the
administration and the integrity of the courts.122 When Francis steps
down, the conservative old guard at the top of the power structure, as
well as the inertia that pervades it, could portend AML’s twilight.123
Even if the next pope is aligned, an exercise of authority could shred
the veneer of judicial independence. The Vatican courts exist in a
paradox of legitimacy: They are expected to check reckless messengers
of the Church, but they cannot bite the hand of the monarch that feeds
them.
Armed with blunt swords and chained to the pope, the Vatican
prosecutors also labor under handicaps due to understaffing and
undertraining. For instance, in its filings before the Southwark Crown
Court, the Vatican insisted that it overpaid for property, but did not
adduce any evidence;124 it alleged that the defendant’s company
engaged in “secretive and dishonest” transactions without ever
substantiating its claim;125 brushing aside court rules, it failed to
provide translations for foreign language documents.126 The list of
missteps drags on, but they converge on the same fact: The London
appearance was an opportunity to debut Francis’ reformist agenda.
Not only was the opportunity squandered, but how the Vatican’s lips
condemned its own cause harpoons the heart of the human resource
deficit prevalent among the Vatican’s AML workforce.127
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The problem contains three aspects. First, a chronic shortage
inflicts the prosecutor’s office and the FIU. Rapid turnover and
memory loss result in disrupted operations, multiple part-time
commitments, and potentially untenable conflicts of interests.128 The
subdued institutional culture adds fuel. Prosecutors are more reactive
than proactive, preferring to freeride on the momentum of convictions
in other countries.129 Even if the Vatican seeks to improve,130 its
wherewithal does not support a conducive learning environment;
ramping up prosecution would further strain its limited resources.
Second, many judges and staff are trained in the Italian legal
tradition. Despite their “proven experience,”131 due to the “complex
and peculiar institutional and juridical reality” of Vatican law,
experience acquired from the other side of Tiber may confer little value
on a tenure in the Vatican.132 One example stands out: In 2019, Francis
appointed Giuseppe Pignatone, Italy’s leading anti-mafia prosecutor,
as the president of the Tribunal of the Vatican City State.
Commentators are divided on his qualifications. On the one hand, one
could argue that Pignatone’s “unique professional skills” gained
through a career of prosecuting complex antimafia cases “compensate
for his inexperience with Vatican law.”133 On the other hand, the
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overlapping workforce implies that the Vatican legal system is
derivative of and dependent on the Italian one.134 At any rate, the
current trajectory of the Vatican courts represents a radical departure
from the “autonom[ous] and independen[t]” judiciary that Francis
envisioned.135
III.

OVERVIEW OF REAL ESTATE AML IN ENGLAND

“Can Pope Francis clean up God’s bank?” queried onlookers
across the Channel, as crooked property deals put priests, cardinals,
and archbishops in the spotlight.136 As readers in England marveled at
the Church’s infiltration of their housing market, the paralysis of
Vatican prosecutions prompted a moment of soul-searching: What can
England do to assist the Vatican’s fight against real estate corruption?
They do not have to look beyond their own Crown Prosecution Service
(“CPS”) and National Crime Agency (“NCA”) for an answer.137 The
CPS, the principal prosecution authority in England, acts as a legal
advisor to law enforcement during criminal investigations, makes
charging decisions post-investigation, and conducts prosecutions
before courts.138 The NCA is tasked with gathering intelligence and
“lead[ing], coordinat[ing] and support[ing] [the UK’s] operational
response.”139 Revealing as its performance in the three proceedings is,
the Vatican’s war on dark money is due for a strategy overhaul. This
Part argues that allying with the CPS and NCA gives the Vatican a
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better shot at tracking its mysterious millions. Three reasons provide
support. First, English prosecutors have a more expansive kit of
substantive laws, in addition to tried-and-true procedures for bringing
economic crime charges. Second, courts in England are further
removed from the executive. Third, the CPS and the NCA have a wider
pool of legal and investigative talents.
A. A More Expansive Toolkit
At the CPS and NCA’s disposal is a repository of laws setting
out grounds for instigating prosecutions and supplying tools to freeze
and recover assets, as well as a bevy of procedural guidance that
illuminates the steps to apply the laws. In the UK, there are three
cardinal AML legislations, respectively revolving around establishing
the criminal offenses of money laundering and a reporting regime,
instituting broader enabler-side compliance requirements, and
buttressing the investigative power of law enforcement. In 2002, the
Proceeds of Crime Act (“POCA”) came into force. POCA defines
money laundering as “the process by which the proceeds of crime are
converted into assets . . . so that they can be retained permanently or
recycled into further criminal enterprises.”140 Under this definition,
both the conversion of proceeds resulting from predicate offenses and
furnishing assistance constitute money laundering.141 To avoid the
commission of these offenses, banks, attorneys, and estate agents must
report “knowledge or suspicion” of money laundering to internal
officers or law enforcement if they can or have information that could
identify the whereabouts of the laundered property.142 Violations are
punishable by a maximum of five years of imprisonment.143 In June
2021, the CPS updated its guidance on money laundering. The revised
guidance strengthens the suspicion limb by requiring the disclosure of
suspicions of money laundering without a conclusive showing that it
actually transpired.144
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Upon POCA’s groundwork, the second legislation, the Money
Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information
on the Payers) Regulations (“The MLRs”), was passed in 2007 and
revised in 2019 and 2020. Like the Vatican’s AML laws, the MLRs
transpose the EU’s Fourth and Fifth Money Laundering Directives.145
The MLR 2017 imposes compliance regulations comprising CDD,
monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping duties on high-risk
transaction facilitators, including estate agents. In particular, relevant
persons must perform risk assessment taking into account their
customer base, geographic areas of operation, products and services,
transactions, and the means of delivery.146 Since 2017, the new MLRs
expanded the obliged entities in the property sector to include letting
agents manage properties rented at €10,000 or more per month, in
addition to requiring actors to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of their customers’ beneficial ownership.147 Despite
these changes, the later iterations preserved the original MLR’s
preventative character. Targeting the financial institutions and the
enablers, the MLRs seek to strike down the fruits of criminal activities
before they ripen.
To complete the picture, the third legislation, the Criminal
Finances Act (“CFA”), amended POCA to debut several powerful
tools for investigating ill-gotten gains.148 The first tool is Unexplained
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Wealth Orders (“UWOs”), which enable enforcement agencies like the
CPS or the NCA to elicit information about properties on reasonable
suspicion that respondents obtained them using proceeds of criminal
conduct. The agency must prepare an application to the High Court
that passes a three-part test: the respondent must be a politically
exposed person, directly involved or connected to persons involved in
serious crimes; the respondent must hold a property valued greater
than £50,000; and the respondent’s lawful income is insufficient to
obtain that property.149 If all criteria are met, the court may grant a
UWO, and the respondents must clarify their interest in the property.
Failure to comply allows the authorities to initiate a civil recovery
proceeding or apply a freezing order to confiscate the property. By
way of opening new channels to information on the provenance and
legitimacy of suspicious properties, UWOs confer additional
investigative capacity upon the enforcement agencies.150
Further Information Orders (“FIOs”) are the second tool to
compel disclosure that the CFA inserted into POCA. If the NCA
receives a disclosure and desires further information, it may apply for
an FIO to the magistrates’ court from the person who made the
disclosure or works in the regulated sector.151 At the threshold, the
application must specify the information sought and the identity of the
respondent.152 Additionally, the application must meet one of the two
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conditions. The first condition is met if the information sought relates
to issues arising from a disclosure and “would assist in investigating
whether a person is engaged in money laundering or in determining
whether an investigation . . . should be started.”153 The second
condition is satisfied when the information sought relates to a
disclosure made under a disclosure requirement, the NCA has
received an external request for the provision of that information, and
the information likely has “substantial value to the authority.”154
Under both prongs, it must be reasonable to seek that information.155
If the court grants the order after deeming the requirements met, the
respondent may comply or appeal the decision to the Crown Court.
Incompliance could result in fines not exceeding £5,000.156 With
greater power to penetrate a property’s history and ownership, the
NCA could now more efficiently ferret out the unclean hands that the
property has passed through.
Looking back, since the UK began to engage with money
laundering in 2014, the Sceptred Isle has glimpsed a housing sector
with greater transparency. In 2018, the FATF Evaluation Report found
that the UK has achieved reasonable success at “routinely and
aggressively identif[ying], pursu[ing] and prioritis[ing] ML
investigations and prosecutions,” with an annual record of 7,900
investigations, 2,000 prosecutions, and 1,400 convictions for money
laundering crimes.157 The UK’s playbook ratifies three crucial tenets—
a preventive orientation, emphasis on regulating the enablers, and
prioritizing the gathering of information—all of which are transferable
for closing the AML loopholes in the Vatican. The pre-emptive
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measures intercept illicit fortunes before they puncture the London
property market; regulations targeting middle persons shut down the
carousels of real estate agents, law firms, and accountants that service
corrupt clients; the investigative tools strip anonymity away from the
largess and ultimately, banish the code of silence that has long eroded
the Vatican.158
B. A More Insulated Judiciary
At all stages of a money laundering case, English judges are
expected to discharge their duties impartially.159 First emerging with
the guarantee of secure judicial tenure in the 1701 Act of Settlement,160
judicial independence becomes statutorily recognized in the 2005
Constitutional Reform Act (“CRA”).161 Judges must apply the law
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“without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.”162 This Subsection
discusses the two characteristics in the selection and retention of
English judges that insulate the administration of equal justice from
outside forces.
First, judges are examined in a rigorous appointment process
that “select[s] on merit, through fair and open competition, from the
widest range of eligible candidates.”163 Prior to the CRA’s passage, the
Lord Chancellor—concomitantly a cabinet member, a member of the
House of Lords, and the head of the judiciary—made judicial
appointments for all but the two highest courts, the House of Lords
and the Court of Appeal.164 Functionally extinguishing the Lord
Chancellor’s power to appoint judges, the CRA establishes the fifteenmember Judicial Appointments Commission (“JAC”), comprised of
lay people, judges, and lawyers selected by open competition to
oversee appointments for judicial candidates “solely on merit,” who
have “good character,” and “the need to encourage diversity.”165 After
the JAC issues its recommendation, the Lord Chancellor must accept
or in rare instances, veto or request reconsideration.166 In short,
designed to prioritize talent and experience over political sway, the
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English system for judicial appointments paves the way to a robustly
insulated judiciary.167
Second, career security grants English judges more
autonomy.168 Above all, judges are largely impervious to the threat of
removal. To remove a judge of the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeal, both Houses must petition the King.169 To remove a circuit or
district judge, the Lord Chancellor must obtain the approval of the
head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice.170 Stable salaries and
immunity further screen judges from the pressure to rule in a certain
direction. Despite earning less than private attorneys, judges make a
comfortable yearly wage of up to £200,000.171 With immunity from
prosecution “for any acts they carry out in performance of their judicial
function” and “for the things they say about parties or witnesses in the
course of hearing cases,” judges are free to decide matters “without
interference from litigants, the State, the media or powerful
individuals or entities.” 172 Compared to their Vatican peers who have
to be receptive to an entity with absolute power, English judges wield
more leverage without extraneous dictates.
C. A Larger AML Workforce
Lastly, British enforcement agencies command formidable
teams, by virtue of greater resources devoted to recruitment and
management. To secure the delivery of their strategic objectives, the
agencies appear to be committed to hiring a diverse and talented




 !3 &) 685) 3&6)59)56 5)%632%&0< ()'5-)( 7,) 7)28386 436-7-32 3* 7,) 35(
,%2')0035 %2( 7,) (-1-2-6,)( 1-2-67)5-%0 -2487    %7  )9)57,)0)66 -2
'314%5-632737,)#%7-'%27,).8(-'-%5<-22+0%2(4)5*3516:-7,*):)5'32675%-276
&)'%86)3*7,)135)'314)7-7-9)%2(75%264%5)276)0)'7-32453')66

 35( ,-00-46 3* $357, %75%9)56  35( ,-)* 867-') 3* 2+0%2( %2( $%0)6
237)  %7

!,-645-2'-40)-623:'327%-2)(-26)'7-32  3*7,) 845)1)3857'7  7
,%62)9)5,%(73&));)5'-6)(-22+0%2( 845)1)3857'7  ' =  "

      !   ,7746:::.8(-'-%5<8/
%&3877,).8(-'-%5<7,).8(-'-%5<7,)+39)521)27%2(7,)'3267-787-32.8(%''-2(
.8(+)6%2(4%50-%1)270%679-6-7)(45 


            
  

    !  ,7746:::.8(-'-%5<8/%&3877,)
.8(-'-%5<7,).8(-'-%5<7,)+39)521)27%2(7,)'3267-787-32.8(%''
-2(-2()4)2()2')0%679-6-7)(45 






 # 



$



workforce at scale.173 Using the NCA and the CPS as examples, this
Subsection showcases how the sheer magnitude of their operations
could lend itself to a productive hunt for shadowy riches.174
In 2020–2021, the CPS permanently employed 5,707 staff and
experienced a 5.1% staff turnover.175 It prosecuted 370,415 cases before
the magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts, 292,744 of which led to
guilty pleas and 12,845 led to convictions after trial.176 It spent £278
million on staff wages and salaries and £112 million on prosecution
costs.177 It achieved a record 70% in the Employee Engagement Index
(“EEI”) in the Civil Service People Survey, which measures civil
servant engagement and wellbeing “on a scale of very disengaged (0%)
to very engaged (100%).”178 On average, the CPS saw a 5% increase in
learning, inclusion, workload, and benefits metrics.179 For the same
year, the NCA employed 3,921 full-time equivalent officers at a
turnover ratio of 7.15%.180 It incurred £222 million in wages and £4.89
million in training and recruitment. In its People Survey, the NCA
achieved 81% satisfaction on team satisfaction and 78% on work
satisfaction.181 In the area of money laundering, the NCA “delivered
four major disruptions against international controller networks and
professional enablers” and inaugurated two initiatives targeting
criminal cash deposits and the smuggling of cash on air passenger
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flights.182 In contrast to the Vatican ASIF’s “staff complement of only
two employees,”183 the stability and dimension of the English labor
market offer its prosecutors more wherewithal to combat money
laundering.
IV.

THE JOINT MODEL: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND ANTICIPATED
OBJECTIONS
A. Jurisdiction, Extradition, and Immunity

This Subsection analyzes the jurisdiction, extradition, and
immunity implications of the three routes English prosecutors could
take to initiate suits: suing the pope or the Holy See,184 suing the
perpetrating clergy or official,185 or suing the enablers. Due to the
paucity of AML legal actions against the Vatican, this Subsection
draws from a more horrific symptom of Church dysfunction: the abuse
of children, women, and men in religious orders. The proliferating
sexual abuse allegations against Roman Catholic Dioceses call
attention to the wrongdoings of top leaders and the Church’s failure
to implement reform. The subsequent litigations initiated by survivors
present a frame of reference for establishing responsibility when
taking the Church to court.
Before reaching the immunity phase, the first option would
likely succumb to a breakdown in attribution. Scholars and attorneys
representing sexual abuse victims have sought to impute the wrongful
acts of the offending clergy to the Holy See or a former pope.186 They
found basis in the International Law Commission Articles on State
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Responsibility, which provides that an act of State includes “the
conduct of any State organ” and “person[s] acting either on the
instructions of or under the direct control of that state.”187 Can clerics
be considered employees of the Vatican, such that the Vatican must
answer for its failure to prevent money laundering? Those who answer
in the affirmative face an uphill battle. The Vatican’s UN Ambassador
in Geneva maintains that clerics are not “functionaries of the Vatican”
but “citizens of their own states [falling] under the jurisdiction of their
own country.”188 US courts share that appraisal: O’Bryan v. Holy See
likens treating the priests as employees of the Church to treating
attorneys as employees of the state bar association.189 Recently, the
European Court of Human Rights dismissed a case brought by Belgian
victims of sexual abuse due to the lack of jurisdiction. There the Court
affirmed that “the Pope was not the principal in relation to the
bishops” because “neither the Pope nor the Holy See had been present
on Belgian territory” at the time of the abuse.190 Although American
and Strasbourg decisions do not previse how an English court would
rule, a prudent judge may find the repercussions of classifying clergy
as Vatican agents tricky to manage.
Even if the prosecutors overcome the jurisdictional hurdle,
their case may crumble before the Herculean labor of dismantling
immunity. In spite of the controversy surrounding Vatican statehood,
etched into international practice is the consensus that the Vatican
could avail itself of attributes of statehood, including immunity.191 As
for prosecuting a current pope, chipping a chink in the armor of head
of state immunity is legally challenging and politically daunting. In
2010, a growing clamor in the UK attempted to hold Benedict XVI
responsible for sex crimes under universal jurisdiction.192 Suing a pope
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is less applicable for money laundering: Not only is it unlikely that the
Church or the popes’ potential knowledge of or involvement in
corruption could trigger responsibility, money laundering also does
not rise to a crime against humanity.
Contingent upon the endurance of the Vatican’s will to clean
house, the viability of prosecuting the offending cleric is less
predictable. Several outcomes are possible. The Vatican may refuse the
UK’s request to extradite a Vatican citizen. Law n. CXXXI of February
22, 2011, grants Vatican citizenship on two grounds, by law or by
administrative decision. Only resident cardinals, diplomats, or
persons residing in the Vatican by reason of office could acquire
citizenship by law, and only persons residing in the Vatican by reason
of office, papal authorization, and marriage or parentage could acquire
citizenship by administrative decision.
The case of the Polish Archbishop Jozef Wesolowski, the
former Apostolic Nuncio, or an ecclesiastical diplomat to the
Dominican Republic, illustrates this outcome. In 2013, following
allegations of child abuse, the Vatican recalled Wesolowski before
Dominican prosecutors could initiate investigations.193 In response to
the extradition request from the Warsaw Office of the Prosecutor, the
Vatican offered a terse refusal: “Archbishop Wesolowski is a citizen of
the Vatican, and Vatican law does not allow for his extradition.”194 In
2015, the Vatican tried Wesolowski at home, but the trial did not
proceed beyond a ten-minute hearing, cut short by “his death . . . from
natural causes.”195 The outcome was unfulfilling, but the lesson is
clear: When the Vatican decides to extend its mantle of immunity, the
transnational prosecutorial machinery is hamstrung.
There are ways for that mantle to retract. First, because money
laundering is often multi-jurisdictional, prosecutors enjoy latitude in
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deciding the best forum. Courts in England could exercise jurisdiction
when supported by statute and criminal codes, or the principles of
territory, personality, and universal jurisdiction.196 If the laundering
act occurred in England, offenses that generated the proceeds
constitute predicate offenses for money laundering in England even if
they took place abroad.197 If the case involves jurisdictions other than
the UK, the offense must have a “substantial connection with this
jurisdiction”—characterized as a substantial number of activities
constituting the crime—for courts in England to exercise
jurisdiction.198 Real estate purchases and sales can plausibly fit in the
activities category.
Second, the accused could voluntarily surrender immunity,
which is not without precedent. When charged with sexual assault by
the Australian police, the Australian Cardinal George Pell chose to face
trial.199 The accused’s readiness to cooperate leaves the feasibility of
this option in a precarious position. Had Pell appealed to his
diplomatic immunity, Australia would have no recourse to force him
back, as the Vatican has not signed any extradition treaties.200 In that
case, the odds that the offenders would answer for their malfeasance
hinge on the destination country’s willingness to hand them over.
Third, the Vatican could lift the perpetrator’s immunity. In
2019, Archbishop Luigi Ventura, the Vatican’s nuncio to France, was
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accused of molesting two men. 201 Ensuing the allegation, the Holy See
waived jurisdictional immunity in “an extraordinary gesture . . . to
collaborate fully and spontaneously with the French judicial
authorities.”202 Francis invoked the same procedure in the money
laundering context when he fired Becciu to enable him to stand trial.
Looking ahead, the Vatican’s keenness to revisit this exceptional
measure is a matter of political forecast. The crystal ball is cloudy, but
Francis’ alacrity to search the elites’ pockets allows a peek into a future
where the Vatican lowers the shield of immunity more frequently.
If the first two options prove ineffective, prosecuting the
enablers may be the best bet. This last option generates fewer
preliminary impasses: Either British citizens or licensed to practice in
England, the enablers are less likely to challenge jurisdiction due to
their territorial presence or nationality. They also present less flight
risk since their professional activities are usually tied to certain
locations. Striking at complicit professionals sounds like a decoy tactic,
but it could lead to an evidentiary holy grail. As the gatekeepers to the
financial underworld, the enablers hold information that helps to
incriminate the real culprits. Furthermore, cracking down on the
enablers is increasingly occupying a greater role in England’s policing
agenda, spearheaded by both the NCA and the CPS.203
B. Foreign Relations
This proposal would be remiss without an addendum on its
foreign relations implications. This Subsection considers two groups
of concerns: England’s readiness to prosecute, and the potential
reception at the Vatican. From England’s perspective, the recent rampup of its AML offense against banks may signal an embrace of its full
prosecutorial capacities in other sectors. In 2021, the UK’s Financial
Conduct Authority, a financial regulatory body with extensive
criminal jurisdiction under the MLRs, meted out a record AML fines




")-''  &'+ 



" '(+1(,)*,2')#&+*+)+!.+"+()#')#+#/*+"#&+# #+#'&' 
&$)*&+",+#'&' "'&*+&+)()#**3         
          0   ")&-#+*
',* '& &$)* +")',!" ,(+ !,#& '& %'&. $,&)#&!    ()+
 





 $ !



%



of $672 million to the NatWest Group, Credit Suisse, and HSBC,
tripling the 2020 fines.204 Whether the Church would fall in England’s
crosshairs is another question. Since the appointment of a British
ambassador to the Holy See in 1982, the Whitehall has maintained
amicable foreign relations with St. Peter’s.205 The Holy See maintains
an Apostolic Nunciature in London established in the same year.206
Judging from the slow but steady current of exchanges between the
two Excellencies in London and Rome, prosecuting a pope, the
Church, or clergy risks disturbing the sediments of diplomacy, which
may be too radical for the UK executive to brook.
Nonetheless, the English judiciary is known to contest
Whitehall’s inhibitions. “[T]he British courts don’t accept [what the
executive says] at face value,” proclaimed the eminent King’s Counsel
Geoffrey Robertson in his outline for England to dispute the supreme
pontiff’s immunity.207 Robertson may represent the minority view, but
England has a legitimate interest to sever the fruits of Vatican
corruption from its housing market. In a 2020 report, HM Treasury and
Home Office concluded that “UK property purchases remain an
attractive method to launder illicit funds due to the large amounts that
can be moved and the low levels of transparency of ownership or
source of funds.”208 The trends converge on one fact: The prosecuting
bodies are gearing up to treat AML in real estate as the main course,
instead of just an appealing appetizer.
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On the other hand, the Vatican may not greet this proposal
with open arms. It may argue that foreign prosecution would suffocate
local efforts and endanger the legitimacy of Vatican law, precisely due
to the infancy of its AML scheme. This argument ignores the alignment
underlying both states’ interests. The CPS and the NCA would enforce
the Vatican’s AML laws as much as English laws. Prosecuting the
laundering of Vatican money in English courts could unearth troves of
evidence for the Vatican prosecutors to inherit, bringing to light the
corruption within the Church and ensuring responsible parties receive
due punishment. Since English prosecutors may request the assistance
of their Vatican peers during the trial, the relevant Vatican organs
could build experience collaborating with foreign entities and acquaint
themselves with established procedures. Most importantly,
implementing this proposal would substantiate Francis’ resolve to
shatter the Vatican’s acquiescence to impunity. Rather than deposing
Vatican’s laws, the proposal burgeons a symbiosis that benefits both
states.
Another question arises: What if England engages in selective
prosecution to further its policy preferences? Since double jeopardy
rules apply to money laundering cases,209 English and Vatican
authorities would be inclined to coordinate their legal strategies.
During that process, the Vatican could initiate discussions on various
safeguards to protect against bias. One example could be a
requirement for bilateral consent or the exhaustion of local remedies
in the Vatican before England prosecutes clergy in select ranks.210
Thus, even if the pope withholds authorization, English prosecutors
could still move against enablers to effectively curb money laundering.
The successful prosecution of any case is a vindication of the
transnational model, as it carries weight for the prosperity and
national security of both the Vatican and England.
C. The Elasticity of the London Market
Still, English prosecutors may mount a futile fight if money
launderers simply purchase properties elsewhere. Released for the
first time in 2020, the public budget for the Holy See’s account office,
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the Administration of the Patrimony of the Apostolic See (“APSA”),
shows that it alone manages 1,200 properties abroad and 4,051 in Italy,
eighty-six percent of which are rented at cut rates.211 The
geographically diversified portfolio means corrupt clerics can skirt
national AML laws by sending their assets to a low-regulation
jurisdiction.
Yet, there is no reason to indulge in pessimism. This proposal
is meant to be a piece of the puzzle, not the entire picture. To forge a
global coalition fit to combat a cross-border crisis, countries must plug
the governance gap within their own borders before kickstarting that
concerted effort. Chatham House offers a three-point roadmap to set
this vision in motion: greater transparency in respect of beneficial
ownership, robust regulation of intermediaries, and an expanded
budget for implementing AML laws.212 As a magnet for dirty money,
the UK is well-situated to be the vanguard of this initiative. A twopronged strategy could ensure a thorough sweep: Whereas FIOs and
the regulations on intermediaries could dissuade middlepersons from
participating in money laundering schemes at the outset, UWOs and
the regulations on transacting with politically exposed persons are
critical tools for detecting money laundering among individual
officials of the Church, since financial crimes committed through real
estate in high-end markets like London are usually characterized by
the perpetrators spending beyond their means.213
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At the same time, other countries with Vatican holdings are
awakening to the call for international cooperation to preserve their
financial integrity. France and Italy in particular are making strides. In
2015, both countries received an “Average” rating in Transparency
International’s Review on G20 promises on Ending Anonymous
Companies.214 Since then, both created central beneficial ownership
registers of registered entities and achieved “Strong” ratings in the
2017 Review.215 Furthermore, both states promulgated laws requiring
lawyers and real estate agents to identify the beneficial owner of clients
and conduct CDD measures based on assessed risk.216 The IMF’s
Assessment Report on AML describes Italy’s Financial Intelligence
Unit (Unità di Informazione Finanziaria) as “well-functioning,” capable
of “produc[ing] good operational [and] high-quality strategic
analyses,” and “adequate[ly]” funded after the “allocation of
additional staff to the analysis division.”217 The IMF notes similar
advances in France, such as the creation of “a new dedicated agency
within the judicial police—a Central Office on Corruption and
Financial and Tax Offenses (OCLCIFF) in 2013,” and “a national
financial prosecutor (PNF) with national jurisdiction for [money
laundering].”218 Although their overall responses are still wanting, EU
countries like France and Italy are well-disposed to help the Vatican
stanch its wound. If England acts as the bellwether in a worldwide
policy paradigm tightening real estate AML, it may animate other
countries to assist in the restoration of financial integrity and public
confidence in the Church.
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D. The Diffusion of Learning
England’s successful execution of this proposal may trigger a
top-down diffusion of learning, emanating from the EU AMLDs. At
the regulatory and legislative level, Francis is eager to turn the page on
recent scandals. After incorporating EU’s fourth and fifth AML/CFT
Directives into its national laws with diligent zeal, the Church has
signaled its “commitment to continue working towards full
compliance with the best international parameters.”219 In 2021, the
European Commission released “an ambitious package of legislative
proposals” comprising four components:220 a regulation creating a
central European AML/CTF authority (“AMLA”), a “single EU
rulebook” directly applicable to each country, new rules for the crypto
sector, and a sixth AMLD with additional regulations for national
supervisors and FIUs.221 If this overhaul package passes through the
European Parliament and Council, whether the Vatican responds or
departs from the EU regime would be the litmus test of its readiness
to adopt modern AML norms.
On the enforcement front, the Vatican lags in investigating and
taking suspects to court. The success of English prosecutors would
incentivize the Vatican to join the fray to improve its reputation,
restore trust in the institution, and recover the cache of papal riches
scattered among swanky manors. In the process, the Vatican agencies
would acclimatize to international best practices in investigation,
charging, conducting hearings and trials, discovery, and plea
bargaining.
However, when it comes to reforming the prosecutorial
culture and governance structure of a microstate ruled by a king in a
white cassock, England’s hands are tied. When England presents its
overtures, the pope has an almost divine right to simply say no. When
the pope permits stagnancy to spread beneath his sandals, foreign
prosecutors are stuck with containing the outpour. Thus, a regional or
international body may be the more appropriate forum to institute
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reform. If the Vatican signs on to the EU’s new AML/CTF package, its
submission to the supervision of the AMLA augurs well for its
integration into the EU AML framework. Armed with more expansive
powers to monitor and take “immediate action to address imminent
risks” than MONEYVAL, the AMLA could require the Vatican to
adopt “specific procedural or governance changes or impos[e]
appropriate sanctions.” 222 Under the AMLA’s watchful eyes, the
Vatican could adopt a more regimented approach to updating its
standards and mitigating AML vulnerabilities. After the AMLA joins
forces with English prosecutors, the combined strength of
transnational and international persuasion may finally give the
Vatican the push it needs to rein in corruption.
CONCLUSION
In January 2020, a year and a half before his trial began,
Cardinal Angelo Becciu sent a curious text message to the then Vatican
investment manager Enrico Crasso, entreating Crasso to “do a good
press campaign” and “[a]sk [his] lawyer if it is appropriate to haggle
our magistrates right away.”223 Later that year, a scandalous portrait
of the London property deal emerged, which Becciu denounced as a
“dark plot[]” and “an unparalleled media pillory.”224 In the coming
months, Becciu may deliver the most high-stake insider revelation in
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the infinite saga of Vatican corruption to extricate himself from a long
fall from favor.225
Breaking the curial omertà is only a starting point. Addressing
the underlying cause that allowed officials to fabricate corruption as
“a standard Vatican practice for dealing with charitable endeavors”
requires a coordinated effort to identify and eradicate the criminal
networks.226 Because of the scant procedural instructions in Vatican
law, the omnipresence of the pope, and a shortage of labor in the AML
sector, the Vatican is underprepared to face that undertaking alone. A
partnership with prosecutors in England allows the Vatican to take
advantage of the English framework’s broadened toolkit, the
separation of the judiciary from external influences, and the large AML
workforce. While these factors contribute to a strong response to
money laundering in real estate, sustaining that alliance poses
practical difficulties, particularly in relation to surmounting
immunity, containing the political repercussions, tackling the
infiltration of illicit finance in other housing markets, and overcoming
the resistance to learning. Nonetheless, one remains hopeful that the
peer pressure and external scrutiny that succeeds the joint model
would inspire a self-examination of the corrupting dynamics that
permit Vatican wealth to flow to elite London real estate. In time, the
Vatican would master the finesse to dismantle the towers of secrecy
from within.
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